After the second world war, American leaders were swept up in the idea of a post-Soviet space filled with stable democracies that were aligned with US interests. Regime change, a policy that involved bringing down governments that were seen as harmful to the country and/or the region, seemed like a natural fit for this vision.
But regime change isn’t always a good thing. In fact, it’s often a bad thing, and this is especially true when it comes to the use of force. This article argues that the reason for this is that when foreign powers attempt to bring down non-democratic regimes, they often don’t pay enough attention to what comes next. They don’t plan well and they often leave the target country worse off than they found it.
The problem is that the goal of regime change, whether it be a revolution or a covert operation, is to replace a government that is perceived as dangerous and hostile by the outsider with one that will better suit the nation’s security or economic interests. But this usually fails, as demonstrated by the failures of Operation PBSUCCESS in Guatemala in 1954, the CIA’s coup against anti-colonialist leader Jacobo Arbenz in 1970, and the US-backed effort to overthrow Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1953.
To be successful, a regime-change campaign should have a multilateral component, a population in the country that supports the rebellion and is willing to embrace democratic governance, and a clear plan for what will happen after the current government falls. The lack of these conditions makes attempting to bomb a country into regime change an extremely risky proposition that should only be used under the most extreme circumstances and with serious consideration for what will follow.